Ruairi O Bradaigh in UCC debate

by tom - Myself Alone Wed Jan 30, 2008 10:39

I believe that in time there will indeed be a United Ireland at the earliest perhaps toward the end of this century.
However there will remain a die hard loyalist opposition to this political situation just as there has always been a die hard republican opposition to the existence of the "Free State" and partition of the island.
Any perception of discrimination against the unionist population in a future united Ireland might well result in a replication of the situation in the late 1960's but this time with unionists and protestants instead of republicans and catholics marching for civil rights with a radical element of loyalist paramilitaries rather than the IRA involved in guerilla war against the forces of the Irish State rather than against forces of the British state. There are plenty of firebrand preachers who would be willing to take Paisley's place as leader of a resistance movement.The Irish government could potentially inherit the same problems faced by British government when governing a hostile population.In recent years there have been civil disturbances in loyalist areas and the PSNI have been attacked.
Ian Paisley and members of the DUP were just as likely to have been targets of Michael Stone's abortive attack on the Stormont as Gerry Adams, Martin McGuinness and Sinn Fein members.

But I'm getting ahead of myself.

A significant number of republicans are deeply unhappy with the return of Stormont and view Adams and McGuinness as traitors to the cause. There remains high unemployment in working class republican areas that traditionally were the recruiting grounds for the IRA and unless peace produces and economic dividend it is likely dissident republicans will gain ground and acts of violence designed to undermine republican "collaborators" will become more familiar.
Acts of violence by dissident republicans would provide ammunition to dissident loyalists and unionists waiting for their chance to bring down the assembly.
When Paisley leaves the political stage and passes to his eternal reward unionism and loyalism will be at a crossroads.
We will either witness the rise of another firebrand preacher opposed to Rome Rule or the demise of the DUP and a softening of unionists attitudes to republicans and to reunification.
The instinctive negative reaction to compromise among unionists and loyalists is likely to persist.
Any unionist who suggests further political involvement in Northern Ireland by the Republic of Ireland is likely to be branded a Lundy and a sell-out. Even Paisley who has lost his leadership of the Free Presbyterian Church and relatives of IRA victims have expressed anger at his u-turn toward Sinn Fein is not immune.

by Non-Republican Wed Jan 30, 2008 12:34

See interesting discussion of some of these issues, which I believe blows RSF and 32CSM out of the water, at the following:

http://cedarlounge.wordpress.com/2008/01/29/new-myths-o...push/

by Frank Wed Jan 30, 2008 15:50

Perhaps if the eloquent quoting of books could arrive at what exactly the IRA's military strategy was between the arms shipments and the ceasefire in 1994 you may begin to have a remote point. Adam's strength in negotiations concerning the British was not synonymous with the military capability of the IRA at the time but with his own ability to be able to sell its ending for the highest price he could. The dichotomy he faced was this: The more capable the IRA the less likely they (the IRA) were to listen to him, the less capable they were the lower the price he could bargain for. He chose the latter because he knew the former would afford him no control whatsoever. Did it ever excite your interest, as it certainly didn't the author of the piece you cite, that the IRA was least active/effective at a time when it was never as well equipped in its entire history? The only thing blown out of the water here is the flimsy rowing boat you're arguing from.

by Non-Republican Wed Jan 30, 2008 16:51

Frank

If you read the entire thread referenced by myself, you will see some interesting challenges to the notion that the arms the IRA had were that great. But even if they were fantabulosi, the point is made that they should be contrasted with the infinitely greatter military capacity of the British army. I might have a machine gun, but if you have twenty of them to my one the odds are that you will win.

Additional points are made about political context - it takes hearts and minds to win a war, as well as guns. Many of the points made suggest that with most Irish people opposed to 'the war', and a serious slow down in the number of volunteers emerging (peopel twigged that a lifetime in jail or a quick disptach to a coffin was a poor deal), a so-called Tet offensive would have temporarily unleashed mayhem but have then would have failed to achieve its political objectives. It is instructive that, after all, utter mayhem existed in 1971/72, with most NI Catholics at that time in support of it, but still the IRA failed to achieve its objectives.

I see no evidence that more mayhem in 1987, let alone now (when most people support the Agreement) would be anything other than a bloody waste of time.

Conspiracy theories about Adams, however consoling ('one more heave and we would have won')really do not address these point,s but rather must try to evade the reality on the ground.

I for one see no sense of repeating tactics that have failed repeatedly, and when no good reasons have been advanced to suggest would be any more effective thsi century than they were in the last.

by Tom Wed Jan 30, 2008 17:34

The Viet Cong used complete suprise to launch attacks against US and Vietnam targets but that was about the sum of their success.
Once they tried to hold ground in stationary positions the back of the Viet Cong was broken by the overwhelming firepower brought to bear upon the guerillas by the US counterattack. Essentially Vietnamese peasants in dressed black pajamas and armed with AK-47 rifles without heavy artillery or tanks or air support were more suited to hit and run attacks in jungles and urban environment. In the "open" entire units were annihilated and in many areas of Vietnam Viet Cong resistance ceased almost completely for the remainder of the war. Post Tet, the remainder of fire fights between US, South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese communist forces were conventional - that is NVA infiltrators who arrived along the Ho Chi Minh trail from North Vietnam rather than South Vietnam.
If the IRA had tried to adopt a Tet style strategy whereby guerillas, part-time amateurs for the most part, who had used stealth and suprise to great effect had adopted open conventional warfare against a numerically superior force with heavy conventional weaponry they would similarly have been annihilated. The British Army would have been smacking their lips.
The hostility of the leftist dominated US press to the Vietnam War transformed the Tet defeat into a "victory" for the Viet Cong.
However the hostility of the British press towards the IRA throughout the Trouble would have led to a British media victory as well as a British military victory.

by Frank Wed Jan 30, 2008 17:49

Non Republican the specific point that I made was to ask anyone agreeing with the article to point out what exactly the IRA's strategy was between the arms shipments and the ceasefire. I'm not talking about proposed or imaginary strategies but actual strategies. You miss the point of my reference to the IRA's armoury at the time quite spectacularly: there was nothing wrong with the caliber of the weaponry, its that no military strategy was applied to them. Why was that?

by Non-Republican Wed Jan 30, 2008 17:59

Frank..I have no intention of rehashing the points made in the thread you referred to - it is all done there. Either you or anyone else who is interested can read it: I believe that many excellent points are made which substantially demolish Republican mythology. Life is too short to exchange the same points with people who rather than learn from past defeats simply want to repeat the tactics that failed yet again. RSF and 32CSM seem to want to 'give it another go.' Sorry, been there, done that, paid the price - time to move on. Bye!

by Frank Wed Jan 30, 2008 18:13

Learning from the past, or indeed failing to learn from it, is not the issue here, the issue is that the analysis that's put forward by you and the article is flawed. The article accuses the 32CSM of retreating to a simplified position whilst at the same time fails to deal with a very salient and simple point, as do you. Hence your exit. If we don't resolve matters, they come back.

by Non-Republican Wed Jan 30, 2008 19:39

This is very much against my instinct, but one tiny try.

Your key point appears to be why was, in your words 'the IRA ... least active/effective at a time when it was never as well equipped in its entire history?' Your answer appears to be - the machinations of Adams/McGuiness, who wanted to 'sell out'. I have said that this point seems pretty much discussed in the thread I drew attntion to, and I would encourage anyoen interested to read it, where the discussion is quite fascinating and intelligent. but somehow you suggest this isn't the case at all.

The alternative explanation, as I understand it from teh thread in question, is that the ranks of the IRA and its leadership seriously considered precisely the military escalation that it appears you favoured. Most concluded that they could definitely unleash mayhem, with many dead and much chaos. But they also concluded that, for many reasons (including a political context in which the majority of Irish people did not approve this course of action), the mayhem would mostly decimate the IRA and the wider nationalist community without achieving its objectives. I personally think this is a sound assessment - I see no reason to imagine that what failed in in 1972 would succeed in 1987 (incidentally, even less likely in 2007 0r 2017), even if the weaponry was better.

If you take a different view, so be it. But I personally have seen no convincing evidence that a relatively small guerrilla group, composed of part time amateurs (and operating in the teeth of opposition from most of the nation it is allegedly defending) could actually achieve its goals through a military uprising. Unless chaos is a goal in itself.

by Frank Wed Jan 30, 2008 20:21

"This is very much against my instinct, but one tiny try."

I suspect that it is alright.

"Your key point appears to be why was, in your words 'the IRA ... least active/effective at a time when it was never as well equipped in its entire history?' Your answer appears to be - the machinations of Adams/McGuiness, who wanted to 'sell out'. I have said that this point seems pretty much discussed in the thread I drew attntion to, and I would encourage anyoen interested to read it, where the discussion is quite fascinating and intelligent. but somehow you suggest this isn't the case at all."

Please do not attribute to me statements or allusions I did not make. The article articulates against an imaginary 'Tet Offensive' but completely fails to address the reality that the IRA did not employ a military strategy to make its efforts more effective at the negotiations table. My first post deals with the reasons why.

"The alternative explanation, as I understand it from teh thread in question, is that the ranks of the IRA and its leadership seriously considered precisely the military escalation that it appears you favoured. Most concluded that they could definitely unleash mayhem, with many dead and much chaos. But they also concluded that, for many reasons (including a political context in which the majority of Irish people did not approve this course of action), the mayhem would mostly decimate the IRA and the wider nationalist community without achieving its objectives. I personally think this is a sound assessment - I see no reason to imagine that what failed in in 1972 would succeed in 1987 (incidentally, even less likely in 2007 0r 2017), even if the weaponry was better."

You take for a given that a 'Tet Offensive" style military offensive was not only being considered but was the only consideration, as does the article. Deeply flawed.

"If you take a different view, so be it. But I personally have seen no convincing evidence that a relatively small guerrilla group, composed of part time amateurs (and operating in the teeth of opposition from most of the nation it is allegedly defending) could actually achieve its goals through a military uprising. Unless chaos is a goal in itself."

That maybe so, but the thrust of your original post was that this article undermines the basis for the existence of the 32CSM and its objections to the Adams direction. Again, deeply flawed.

by Non-Republican Thu Jan 31, 2008 01:05

Frank

You face two basic strategic choices:

1. Compromise (somehow...)
2. Renew the war, in the happy conviction that it will prevail (this time).

The thread I drew attention to debated a time in history (1987) when many Republicans thought option 2 was a realistic notion. It discussed why this was a fallacy, and suggested that a recognition of why it was a fallacy permeated so many within the IRA at various levels that 'the Tet offensive' idea was abandonedi n favour of a peace process.

If you have seriosus grounds for suggesting that an escalation of the military struggle, then or now, (to whatever degree) is or was likely to yield better results than the offensive of the early 70s, or any other time in the 20th century I would not mind heasring it. OItherwise, you are merely suggesting blood, toil, sweat and tears to no end. I rather think that this is the dismal perspective of dissident republicanism.

Note by the way that is not teh same as suggesting that Adams is right - but if he is wrong, it does not logically follow that you must be in a better position to deliver victory.

by Frank Thu Jan 31, 2008 17:48

"You face two basic strategic choices:

1. Compromise (somehow...)
2. Renew the war, in the happy conviction that it will prevail (this time)."

Strange that the article you place so much faith in condemns the 32CSM for adopting a simplistic approach yet here you are with a 'your either with us or against us' scenario. Damned if you do, damned if you don't.

Explain what you mean by 'prevail'?

"The thread I drew attention to debated a time in history (1987) when many Republicans thought option 2 was a realistic notion."

For argument sake I'm going to take it that by prevail you mean a military victory? That was never a realistic notion. What many republicans believed was at the time the war could have been elevated to a level wherein it would have more political impact on the thinking of the British establishment. This now becomes the crucial question: In the absence of any military strategy how could the IRA leadership at the time take the view that the war could not be escalated?

"It discussed why this was a fallacy, and suggested that a recognition of why it was a fallacy permeated so many within the IRA at various levels that 'the Tet offensive' idea was abandonedi n favour of a peace process."

Garbage. What the article does is try to justify its own conclusions by arguing from a set of premises that it has fatally misread. Its easy to say 'we can't have a Tet Offensive ergo we must have a 'peace process''. What it needs to address is why the IRA leadership during a decade of unprecedented access to weaponry, did not employ even the most basic of military strategies?

"If you have seriosus grounds for suggesting that an escalation of the military struggle, then or now, (to whatever degree) is or was likely to yield better results than the offensive of the early 70s, or any other time in the 20th century I would not mind heasring it. OItherwise, you are merely suggesting blood, toil, sweat and tears to no end. I rather think that this is the dismal perspective of dissident republicanism."

You lack even the most basic grasp of republican politics, as does the article which is clearly from a Workers Party style analysis. The military struggle of the seventies was devoid of a political strategy other than Brits Out. Conversely the political struggle of the eighties was devoid of a military strategy to augment it other that 'we want to see an end to all military actions'. The political employment of the war was reduced to a slogan 'Armalite and Ballot Box' the fallacy of which ended up with one aspect being a political drawback for the other. Where that has led Adams to is a position that 'dissident republicans' are not merely wrong, but criminal, under British law. That some compromise to make with British, perhaps you could point out what was the reciprocal British compromise?

"Note by the way that is not teh same as suggesting that Adams is right - but if he is wrong, it does not logically follow that you must be in a better position to deliver victory."

That's your reasoning to justify your own conclusions, just as the article does. You apply a false position to the 32CSM then proceed to argue against it. Adams has done the same and you and the articles writer have fallen for it. Again I refer you to the dichotomy Adams faced.

by Non-Republican Thu Jan 31, 2008 18:13

Frank

It is very difficult to determine precisely what your suggested strategy is here. Ok, you accept that heightened military activity cannot prevail - ie force the British out and achieve a united Ireland. Therefore.... The argument is rather suspended in mid-air. You seem to imply (nothing is made quite clear) that an escalated military campaign plus a dose of politics would work - since as you say the 70s campaign lacked any politics, and the politics campaign of the 80s lacked enough firepower on the streets. So the way ahead is? More bombings, combined with a political campaign?

It is at least an argument. I personally think it is nonsense, and that the two cannot work in combination, but it is at least a view....

by Frank Thu Jan 31, 2008 18:24

"It is very difficult to determine precisely what your suggested strategy is here. Ok, you accept that heightened military activity cannot prevail - ie force the British out and achieve a united Ireland. Therefore.... The argument is rather suspended in mid-air. You seem to imply (nothing is made quite clear) that an escalated military campaign plus a dose of politics would work - since as you say the 70s campaign lacked any politics, and the politics campaign of the 80s lacked enough firepower on the streets. So the way ahead is? More bombings, combined with a political campaign?

It is at least an argument. I personally think it is nonsense, and that the two cannot work in combination, but it is at least a view...."

Adams has failed the republican project. The prevailing view however, augmented by Adams' revisionism, is that he hasn't. That is what confronts Irish republicanism now. Adams now argues the way Fianna Fail used to argue to justify their integration into the constitutional status quo. The strategy for Irish republicanism now, the only option open to it, is to regroup around the recognition of this reality.

by Non-Republican Thu Jan 31, 2008 18:39

Frank

This is still somewhat vague. You advocate that Republicans 'regroup', aroudn a recognition of the failure of Adams - this seems the full sum of your strategic insight. What does this 'regrouping' consist of? More armed struggle, with a dose of politics stirred in? I, in common with the majority of Irish people, don't really see any evidence that this will work, or that essentially returning to what failed in the past, albeit with a bit of fine tuning, would be worth the blood and sacrifice required.

by Frank Thu Jan 31, 2008 18:47

"This is still somewhat vague. You advocate that Republicans 'regroup', aroudn a recognition of the failure of Adams - this seems the full sum of your strategic insight. What does this 'regrouping' consist of? More armed struggle, with a dose of politics stirred in? I, in common with the majority of Irish people, don't really see any evidence that this will work, or that essentially returning to what failed in the past, albeit with a bit of fine tuning, would be worth the blood and sacrifice required."

But what has succeeded? You keep referring to republican failure, can you point to non republican success? The RM in the eighties had it within their capability to deliver a political arrangement with the British which contained an automatic dynamic toward unity. It didn't fail, Adams failed to act upon that ability. We are now where we are at, republicans need to recognise that excoriating Adams will do as much good as excoriating Fianna Fail. The Northern Statelet is by no means a settled entity.

by Non-Republican Thu Jan 31, 2008 19:08

Frank

You are missing or evading the point.

For the sake of argument, let us grant that everything you say about the strategy of Adams and co is correct. It does not follow that your alternative (which is?) would necessarily fare any better. I infer that you want a mixture of war and politics - although you are so vague on what this 'Republican regroupment' would consist of that it is hgard to be sure. If this is your position (and if you do not advocate some resumption of war, please say so), you must demonstrate some credible reasons why it will achieve your goals. Mere assertion will not do. Where is the beef?

Why should something which failed utterly in the 20th century succeed in the 21st, albeit with one or two variations? It isn't enough to say that your Republican opponents have let you down - you need to show that what you advocate is based on some plausible premises and hope of victory. Otherwise, as I said earlier, you are merely advocating a great deal of horror (since this is what war inevitably entails) with no realistic end or victory in sight. Unless war for the sake of it is somehow an appealing prospect.

by Frank Thu Jan 31, 2008 19:27

"For the sake of argument, let us grant that everything you say about the strategy of Adams and co is correct. It does not follow that your alternative (which is?) would necessarily fare any better."

I never said that it did. What I did say originally was that your original contention of our position being blown out of the water by the arguments outlined in the article is false. Any republican alternative strategy must first deal with the fallout of the Adams direction just as it had to deal with the Anglo Irish Treaty of 1922. Therefore the basis upon which the GFA was entered into needed to be challenged because once again the British sought an Irish mandate for its presence. The 32CSM did exactly that.

http://www.32csm.info/UNsubmission.html
http://www.32csm.info/idfu.html
http://www.32csm.info/sbg.html
http://www.32csm.info/sig.html
http://www.32csm.info/su.html
http://www.32csm.info/sprov.html

"I infer that you want a mixture of war and politics - although you are so vague on what this 'Republican regroupment' would consist of that it is hgard to be sure. If this is your position (and if you do not advocate some resumption of war, please say so), you must demonstrate some credible reasons why it will achieve your goals. Mere assertion will not do. Where is the beef?"

You can infer what you want, just as the article does, because it seems you're only comfortable arguing against what it is you want the republican position to be. As of now what republicans need to do is regroup around an agreed position in an agreed way. The issue of war is for those who wage it and argue it should b. The relevance of war is how relevant war can make itself.

http://www.32csm.info/ru.html
http://www.32csm.info/pid.html

"Why should something which failed utterly in the 20th century succeed in the 21st,"

It didn't fail, it was failed against, twice.

"It isn't enough to say that your Republican opponents have let you down - you need to show that what you advocate is based on some plausible premises and hope of victory. Otherwise, as I said earlier, you are merely advocating a great deal of horror (since this is what war inevitably entails) with no realistic end or victory in sight. Unless war for the sake of it is somehow an appealing prospect."

I've already stated clearly that its no use excoriating the past but yet you persist with the inference that I do because clearly you're more comfortable arguing against the strawman. This is what the 32CSM is advocating for republicanism and why.

http://www.32csm.info/rui.html
http://www.32csm.info/dp.html

by Paschal Thu Jan 31, 2008 22:50

The question is not whether there will be, or should be, a resumption of armed ''struggle'', but for what purpose. The history of the republican movement has shown that the head always eventually becomes detached from the arse. Reference republican congress in the 1930s, Sinn Fein the Workers Party in the 1970s and the eventual realisation of the futility of their stategy by the Sinn Fein leadership in the 1980s. Guns and bullets are only necessary when guns and bullets are the only option. When nationalism is the only driving force and unification the only goal,what next! There surely has to be a higher level of aspiration.

by Barry - 32 csm Fri Feb 01, 2008 09:42

and did it have a future

Eoghan Harris made repeated attempts over the previous months to have that question changed to one on nationalism . When he failed to do so he withdrew from the debate at the very last minute . It would appear then that this reactionary mouthpiece , censor and state appointee believes republicanism may well have a future , and is afraid to discuss it when not permitted to misrepresent it .

Sadly Paschal is attempting to misrepresent the issue in the same manner as Eoghan Harris . The issue is not nationalism , which has been adequately dealt with and concluded within the confines of the Belfast treaty ( as it had previously been in 1922 and a previous treaty) and its institutionalised sectarianism , but republicanism which has not been . That is why Eoghan Harris was very happy and confident to go to a debate in Conway Mill on the Falls road last summer and pour scorn on sinn fein but pulled out of the Cork debate , on his home turf , upon republicanism after repeated attempts to make sure that debate was not aired .

The issue of republicanism is one of a nationwide democracy , and the struggle to remove the obstacles to the practice of a nationwide democracy . The struggle for the principle to determine our own future . The upholding of the rights of our people to practice a nationwide democracy without it being subject to foreign vetoes and the limitations another state believes it has the right to place upon our democracy to secure their own interests at the expesne of ours . Its a very important principle . Conceding that principle puts the democratic rights of the Irish people at the bottom of the political agenda . And from that political agenda numerous associated undemocratic evils flow . A republican agenda must put the principle of democracy at its maximujm expression to the forefront . 32 CSM believes that its internal practice is vital to secure it as an outcome .

by Paschal Fri Feb 01, 2008 16:56

Barry. You misread me. I am no apologist for Eoghan Harris. I was merely interested in whether shedding blood for a process ,as apposed to an attempt to create a new society, was worth the while. Given your knowledge of republicanism you will also be undoubtably aware that the concept of republicanism presupposes the attempt to unite those in present conflict against their common enemy. Who is that enemy and how do you propose to unite those in conflict. I think that it was Cahal
Goulding who said, 'the Officials were right too soon, the Provisionals were right too late, O'Bradaigh was never right'

by Cael Fri Feb 01, 2008 17:16

Republican militarism - and folly
by Non-Republican Wed Jan 30, 2008 12:34
See interesting discussion of some of these issues, which I believe blows RSF and 32CSM out of the water, at the following:

http://cedarlounge.wordpress.com/2008/01/29/new-myths-o...push/

Much as I respect Worldbystorm, and have debated many times with him on Politics.ie, I believe he is guilty here of a sin that he is, himself, quick to point out in others, i.e. setting up a strawman for himself to easily knock down. Irish Republicans have never put any faith in some kind of 'tet offensive' type strategy. Jim Lynagh's strategy was, indeed, influenced by his reading of Mao, but he was talking about creating psychologically liberated areas, rather than areas were the enemy could not enter, i.e. creating areas were the population gave their loyalty to the Irish Republic and largely ignored Crown law. This remains the only way liberation can be achieved in Ireland. When people are free in their minds, then freeing their bodies from the vice of Crown misrule will be a fairly simple matter. The GFA copperfastens Crown misrule in the minds of the Irish people and presents it as the ONLY possibility. When Adamsites talk about Stormont Castle as being THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE, they are, of course, denying the possibility of the concept of 'an alternative'. You cannot logically have 'an only alternative,' for an alternative to exist at all there has to be ANOTHER alternative.

by WorldbyStorm - Cedar Lounge Revolution Fri Feb 01, 2008 22:59

In fairness, Cael, and nice to see you around and about... I'm only dealing with the substance of Moloney's book. If strawman there is as regards Tet, then he's the one who created it (along with David McKittrick, Peter Taylor, Brendan O Boyle and other historians of the PIRA). All these authors argue that a Tet offensive was seriously considered. As for Lynagh, it's hard, on the evidence available to agree with your contention that it was meant to be a liberated area of the mind. His plans for flying columns were very much about the reality...

by WorldbyStorm Fri Feb 01, 2008 23:24

Frank, as the author of the CLR piece can I address the questions you raise. Firstly, what was the strategy through to 1994? Clearly to continue the "Long War' strategy and to extend it as best as was possible to the UK but not to allow it to derail negotiations. I disagree that that led to a 'less capable' IRA, but led instead to one which was more nuanced.

There was a clearly defined shift away from the North by the early 1990s and towards the UK.

Secondly, as Moloney notes, the arms were far from what they were cracked up to be. Most were already obsolete or simply unsuitable for use in the North in the context of a non-conventional conflict.

Thirdly, and related to your point 'that the IRA was least active/effective at a time when it was never as well equipped in its entire history?', there are so many obvious reasons for this which I actually did refer to. Firstly the increasing level of sophistication of British surveillance, both human and otherwise. The successes as regards the former, by the British, in terms of infiltration I'd suspect were in part generated by a response amongst those involved to the length of the conflict at that point. It's a basic precept of any situation that if no forward movement is seen those involved tend to lose heart.

As I've just noted, it wasn't as well equipped as you suggest. Sure it had lots of guns... but without sufficient people willing to use them what was the point? Arguably the IRA was losing popularity throughout this period (the performance of SF certainly indicates that), not to mention the attrition rate from combat. And through the AIA, however limited, the South had become a player - something which had a knock on effect not merely with the SDLP constituency, but also that of SF.

But I'd actually that PIRA was as effective as it could be given those constraints. Still even that is to miss the point. What level of violence would conceivably bring the British to the table and simultaneously retain support amongst the Nationalist/Republican base?

To talk vaguely of 'military strategy', or to accuse people of not having one, is frankly wrong. PIRA did have a military strategy, one shaped entirely by what they had and what they could do. And one can see how within the Long War strategy many different approaches were engaged with even within say a ten year period from 1984 to 1994, a British campaign, a European campaign, attacks within the North on civilian subcontractors, on the UDR/RUC, on barracks, on the Army, etc, etc...

Incidentally, it's certainly not a WP analysis (whatever that might be at this stage) and as it happens I've been criticised by WP members past and present for presenting too Republican a view of the conflict.

by Cael Sat Feb 02, 2008 15:54

Hi Cael!
by WorldbyStorm - Cedar Lounge Revolution Fri Feb 01, 2008 22:59
In fairness, Cael, and nice to see you around and about... I'm only dealing with the substance of Moloney's book. If strawman there is as regards Tet, then he's the one who created it (along with David McKittrick, Peter Taylor, Brendan O Boyle and other historians of the PIRA). All these authors argue that a Tet offensive was seriously considered. As for Lynagh, it's hard, on the evidence available to agree with your contention that it was meant to be a liberated area of the mind. His plans for flying columns were very much about the reality...

Hi WBS, spend most of my time on IRBB these days. I may not have read your article with enough attention and accept that it was McKittrick et al who set up the Tet Strawman and not you. Unfortunately, your article was being presented as some kind of Final Solution to Republicanism by non republican. I fully accept that you did not write it in this vein. Even if a Tet Offensive, Irish Style, was being considered, Im sure you'll accept that such consideration has no baring whatsoever on the arguments of traditional Republicans today.

As for reality and the reality of the mind, I would say that when an idea becomes established as 'the norm' in a population's minds then it quickly becomes the external reality also. As the word Flying Column suggests, they are not ment to actually capture and hold territory, but to give the people the feeling that the forces of the Republic have a concrete presence among them and that enemy law is just one possibility - the possibility of native Irish law is being presented, i.e. a war of hegemony is taking place.

by WorldbyStorm Sun Feb 03, 2008 15:19

Hi again, ah, sure, I've migrated away from P.ie too... I tend to think our discussions were the good old days... :)

Anyhow, I sort of agree with you as regards the 1980s situation not necessarily having a baring on today i.e., there is no scope for such an offensive. But my point was that many on P.ie who represented a non-PSF Republican stance certainly did see the mid to late 1980s as a missed opportunity, and indeed Frank here is fairly clear - although not giving us any detail - that some other strategy was possible, so it was really a consideration of that viewpoint, not in a dismissive way, but simply looking at the facts, as best we can establish them and seeing whether that viewpoint was consistent with those facts. And that does have political ramifications today because it is promoted as an example of the bad faith of PSF then and subsequently, i.e. that it somehow represented a ramping or winding down of the armed struggle, whereas I'd tend to see it as evidence of the limitations of armed struggle.

Re reality, yep, I'd agree with you, Lynagh certainly saw flying columns initially as a precursor to a later situation. But, I somehow doubt he'd have couched it in the terms you do as regards 'Irish law'... I think it was a lot more basic than that... but yes, in a way it obviously was seen as a means of reasserting hegemony.

The problem with that argument is that one might also argue that that was also the basis for the 'Long War' strategy introduced by Adams et al and that faced with the limitations of armed struggle they shifted to a political path. After all, one might suggest that Republicans (and, yeah, I'm aware of the can of worms I open by using that phrase) in power in the North, whatever the nature of the assembly/executive, is innately counter-hegemonic to Unionism.

by Frank Sun Feb 03, 2008 17:15

"Frank, as the author of the CLR piece can I address the questions you raise. Firstly, what was the strategy through to 1994? Clearly to continue the "Long War' strategy and to extend it as best as was possible to the UK but not to allow it to derail negotiations. I disagree that that led to a 'less capable' IRA, but led instead to one which was more nuanced."

The question I specifically asked was: What was the military strategy in the years mentioned? There wasn't one. The Ballot Box was not complimented by the Armalite but was actually complicated by it as the Adams strategy employed the electoral strategy. And this leads to the crucial dichotomy that adams faced that I alluded to earlier. A more effective armed campaign weakened Adam's hand both within the IRA to push his alternative and also with the British who viewed his value to them in terms of his ability to end the armed campaign. The Adams strategy necessitated a weak and static armed campaign.

"There was a clearly defined shift away from the North by the early 1990s and towards the UK."

No. What happened in the North was the natural consequence of not employing a tangible strategy to the armed campaign there. It fizzled. And what needs to be understood is that the source of any armed campaign in the UK stems from abilities in Ireland and weakness in one is translated to the other.

"Secondly, as Moloney notes, the arms were far from what they were cracked up to be. Most were already obsolete or simply unsuitable for use in the North in the context of a non-conventional conflict."

Its a bad tradesman that blames his tools. If an Iraqi tribesman can bring down an Apache Attack Helicopter with a bolt action .303 rifle I'm sure the aresnal at the IRA's disposal offered similar opportunities.

"Thirdly, and related to your point 'that the IRA was least active/effective at a time when it was never as well equipped in its entire history?', there are so many obvious reasons for this which I actually did refer to. Firstly the increasing level of sophistication of British surveillance, both human and otherwise. The successes as regards the former, by the British, in terms of infiltration I'd suspect were in part generated by a response amongst those involved to the length of the conflict at that point. It's a basic precept of any situation that if no forward movement is seen those involved tend to lose heart."

You can't blame informers etc for the deliberate absence of a military strategy. No matter the resources at your disposal strategy still needs to be employed. And it wasn't.

"As I've just noted, it wasn't as well equipped as you suggest. Sure it had lots of guns... but without sufficient people willing to use them what was the point? Arguably the IRA was losing popularity throughout this period (the performance of SF certainly indicates that), not to mention the attrition rate from combat. And through the AIA, however limited, the South had become a player - something which had a knock on effect not merely with the SDLP constituency, but also that of SF."

But again you fail to comprehend the effects on an organization like the IRA of not having a military strategy. People see no tangible reason for their actions. It just seems war for war's sake. But the South's role via the AIA was to neutralise the republican raison detre and steer PSF into an electoral challenge which would be viewed as a de facto referendum on the armed struggle. And this is wher the conflict between Armalite and Ballot box tangibly emerged.

"But I'd actually that PIRA was as effective as it could be given those constraints. Still even that is to miss the point. What level of violence would conceivably bring the British to the table and simultaneously retain support amongst the Nationalist/Republican base?"

But this is the problem isn't it? We were no loner concerned about the Nationalist/ Republican base but the PSF electoral base which was not one and the same.

"To talk vaguely of 'military strategy', or to accuse people of not having one, is frankly wrong."

No, its the glaring hole in your argument.

"PIRA did have a military strategy, one shaped entirely by what they had and what they could do."

Again No. They had no military strategy at a time of an unprecedented arsenal at their disposal. You cannot argue this reality away. Just as you cannot argue away responsibility for that situation from the IRA's leadership which was predominated by the Adams line of thought.

"And one can see how within the Long War strategy many different approaches were engaged with even within say a ten year period from 1984 to 1994, a British campaign, a European campaign, attacks within the North on civilian subcontractors, on the UDR/RUC, on barracks, on the Army, etc, etc..."

The Long War Strategy and a strategy for that long war are not one and the same. It didn't have to be attrition.

"Incidentally, it's certainly not a WP analysis (whatever that might be at this stage) and as it happens I've been criticised by WP members past and present for presenting too Republican a view of the conflict."

Seems a bit 'stagey'.

by Cael Sun Feb 03, 2008 18:38

I have to disagree with you that Adams and Co. being in Stormont Castle is counter-hegemonic to Unionism. Quite the contrary. Many Ulster Unionists may well be upset at the sight of former members of the IRA serving as Crown Ministers, but if they really stopped to think about it they would see what a massive victory for Crown law that is. The current status quo really only allows for a continuation of the hegemony of British culture and law on the island of Ireland. Even if the 06 gradually becomes more and more of a free state, seperate from Westminster, Stormont Castle now has the opportunity to build an elite around it, whos privilage will be based on Stormont Castle, as the privilage of the southern elite is based on Leinster House. I have little doubt that this new Stormont elite (where money and not religion or nationality will be what matters) will be prepared to commit any war crime to protect their privilege - just as the 26 county elite were.

On the issue of armed struggle, of course it is limited. Unless you are willing and able to actually nuke England you can hardly expect to gain an all out military victory. The real battle, as far as Im concerned is in the minds of the Irish people. This is the great error of the Adamsites; they have closed down the range of possibilities available to the minds of their supporters. It would seem, according to Adams, that Irish law is always going to have its origin in English Crown law. Refering to ó Brádaigh's address above, the only narrative that can come from Stormont Castle is one of a revolted colony, not that of an ancient nation.

If I may quote a paragraph I wrote on the IRBB website:

"As Kant put it, the free/rational agent is marked by the ability to make an "absolute beginning", a new start, broken away from past cause, i.e. to break the slavish circle of cause and effect. This is what was achieved by the Irish people in the 1916 Rising and the Declaration of Independance 1918. We stepped outside of English Crown law and created, from new, our own Law of the Republic. This was a true and authentic free act.

The imposition of partition, Stormont Castle and Leinster House, was a regression away from this "absolute beginning" and a falling back into the slavish threadmill of the Irish people being merely an effect of an English cause."

If you think about it, right through the history of mankind, a small privileged few have been surrounded by millions of slaves. What is it that keeps the slave in slavery? I would say the ultimate answer is in the mind of the slave him/herself, and not in the superior will of the master.

by WorldbyStorm Sun Feb 03, 2008 20:58

"The question I specifically asked was: What was the military strategy in the years mentioned? There wasn't one. The Ballot Box was not complimented by the Armalite but was actually complicated by it as the Adams strategy employed the electoral strategy. And this leads to the crucial dichotomy that adams faced that I alluded to earlier. A more effective armed campaign weakened Adam's hand both within the IRA to push his alternative and also with the British who viewed his value to them in terms of his ability to end the armed campaign. The Adams strategy necessitated a weak and static armed campaign."

That's not true. There were a number of strategies as I noted before. The UK strategy wasn't static. But, as was seen later with RIRA, even there it's difficult to mount a UK campaign in the 20th/21st century. Europe was more difficult again. The North provided the starkest example of these difficulties. Low level attacks were possible, large scale ones were much successful.

Look at the record. Loughall, et al. The British security forces were able to shut down PIRA activities. Not completely of course, but certainly sufficiently to inflict grievous blows to PIRA. And in a sense this was hardly an uncontained response by the British. There was no shift towards internment, just steady attrition.

But to be honest I'm wondering what you mean by strategy. You suggest the armed campaign fizzled out. Look at the numbers of PIRA Volunteers killed between 1985 and 1992. That wasn't fizzling out, that was serious engagement, but it was unsuccessful engagement. The obvious result of a vastly more sophisticated British intelligence capability. Nor do those figures speak of an organisation without a military strategy as you allege, quite the opposite. They were out there doing something.

As for your Apache helicopter point, that being the case, and seeing as ASU's were better equipped than your Iraqi tribesman, I'd like to know your explanation as to why that didn't happen. But just looking it up I wonder whether they were .303s. The media reports seem to indicate other more sophisticated weapons, hardly a surprise since post-Saddam Iraq is awash with military level material.

I'd strongly argue that the very existence of informers in PIRA at all stages of its history, and in legacy groups, demonstrates that there are clear limitations on prosecuting armed conflict and expecting to be successful.

"Seems a bit 'stagey'."

In what respect?

by Cael Tue Feb 05, 2008 17:09

I would tend to agree that once the Adamsite PIRA had accepted Leinster House as legitimate, they had pulled the philosophical rug from under themselves and continuing an armed struggle was only about what terms of employment they were going to get from the English Crown. This is what I find most morally repulsive. Sending out idealistic young volunteers to face death, injury and capture, telling those volunteers that they are fighting for the Irish Republic, when in fact, the leadership had already abandoned the Republic and were suing for surrender terms on the quiet.