Aljazeera in English

Thursday March 20, 2003 19:28

by kokomero

By any conventional military measure Saddam Hussein is a dwarf and the Iraqi armed forces are much weaker than they were on the eve of “The Mother of All Battles”. Saddam probably has a considerable chemical and biological weapons program, but, in the absence of a powerful conventional force, it is more or less all he has and is best suited for deterrence. As for nuclear weapons, he does not have them yet. Should he acquire them, then the American arsenal that, at the height of the Cold War, succeeded in deterring 2,300 Soviet delivery vehicles with perhaps 10,000 warheads (plus another 10,000 in reserve) should be more than sufficient to deter Saddam as well. In the mind of countless people around the world, including many Americans, all of this raises the question why the US appears determined to make war against Saddam at this time.

An unequal war

When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait back in 1990, we were told that the Iraqi armed forces were the fifth largest in the world (after those of the U.S, USSR, China, and India).

“Experts” competed with each other in touting them, claiming that a war with Iraq could only be won at the cost of perhaps 5,000-10,000 Allied casualties, including 1,500 dead; those, and there were a few, who claimed that the war would be a “parade” were laughed at or silenced.

We all watched CNN, and we all know what the outcome was. Subjected to an air campaign to which they had no response, the Iraqi armed forces proved much weaker than expected. Some were killed, some surrendered, and many more escaped. The war only cost the Allies about 200 killed in combat, 148 of whom were American. About one quarter of the dead were killed by friendly fire.

Twelve years later, the fronts are being drawn up again. Except that this time, Iraq’s armed forces are much weaker still. According to the best available international figures, overall strength is down by more than half (from one million to about 450,000).

Out of 5,500 main battle tanks, only 2,200 are left. The corresponding figures are 4,000 and 1,400 for armored infantry fighting vehicles; 6,000 and 1,400 for armored personnel carriers; 3,500 and 2,050 for artillery barrels (both towed and self propelled); 635 and 171 for fighters and attack aircraft; and 479 and 375 for helicopters.

What is more, whereas in 1990 Iraq’s military equipment was modern—it had, after all, been provided by France, the USSR, and South Africa among others—by now it is badly out of date.

Even during the First Gulf War Iraqi fighter aircraft, confronted by American ones, could only turn tail and try to escape (over 100 fled to Iran). Even then the most modern tank in Saddam’s hands, the Soviet-built T-72, proved no match for the American Abrams which, relying on superior gunsights and depleted uranium rounds, blew away their turrets at the first shot.

Since then the U.S has been upgrading its equipment, adding everything from GPS-guided bombs through B-2 bombers to directed energy devices allegedly capable of knocking out electronic devices from a distance. Not so Saddam, who has to make do with the kind of junk that, in Afghanistan, can be bought for $500 a piece.

Iraq being a landlocked country surrounded by enemies on most sides, sanctions against it have proved very effective; in all probability Saddam is unable to maintain the weapons he has. Which means that, in reality, the decline in his military power has been much greater than the above figures indicate.

With most of their home country declared a no fly zone, and with their communications and air defenses coming under constant attack, in ten years the Iraqi armed forces have not succeeded in shooting down (or, as far as is known, seriously damaging) a single American or British combat aircraft.

“The poor man’s deterrent”

Nor has this been for lack of trying; at one time, according to published sources, Saddam promised a reward to the first anti-aircraft battery that would succeed. Thus the only thing that stands between him and destruction are the chemical and biological weapons he may have. Weapons which, in different contexts, have sometimes been known as “the poor man’s deterrent”.

It is true that, in the past, Saddam has not hesitated to use weapons of mass destruction either against Iranian positions or against his own defenceless Kurdish population. The outcome was the death of thousands; however, doing so to ward off an American offensive would be a different matter altogether.

In the first phase, given the rapid pace and vast spread of modern armored operations, such an attempt would require drenching entire provinces with chemicals or germs, something never before tried by anyone and which may not, in fact, be practicable.

In the second, assuming that the fighting takes place in the towns and especially in Baghdad, it would occasion such casualties among Iraq’s own civilian population as might make even Saddam blanche. Finally, using such weapons, also against Israel, would both invite and justify awesome retaliation. Such as might, in fact, mean the effective destruction of Iraq.

There remains the question of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. At present, not even Saddam’s worst enemies claim he has such weapons. Given enough time, resources, and freedom of action he may get them in the future, though how long it will take remains moot.

Even more moot is the question as to what the effect of such weapons in Saddam’s hands might be. While some fear they might make him more aggressive and more dangerous, the opposite might well be the case.

After all, and beginning already in Stalin’s time, half a century’s experience with such weapons proves that they are most useful for deterrence whereas the offensive advantage that they confer is small to nonexistent. As to using nuclear weapons on one’s own soil to ward off an attack, to anyone familiar with the consequences it does not sound like a good idea.

By any conventional military measure Saddam Hussein is a dwarf and the Iraqi armed forces are much weaker than they were on the eve of “The Mother of All Battles”. Saddam probably has a considerable chemical and biological weapons program, but, in the absence of a powerful conventional force, it is more or less all he has and is best suited for deterrence.

As for nuclear weapons, he does not have them yet. Should he acquire them, then the American arsenal that, at the height of the Cold War, succeeded in deterring 2,300 Soviet delivery vehicles with perhaps 10,000 warheads (plus another 10,000 in reserve) should be more than sufficient to deter Saddam as well. In the mind of countless people around the world, including many Americans, all of this raises the question why the US appears determined to make war against Saddam at this time.

Prof. Martin van Creveld is on the faculty of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, and is considered one of the world’s leading experts on military history and strategy.