EFSP Update March 2003

national | miscellaneous | news report Wednesday March 26, 2003 23:44 by D. Public

Over the past few months, the European Union’s foreign policy agenda has witnessed two contradictory trends: the emergence of new challenges (e.g. intra European and European-US tensions regarding war in Iraq) and the resolution of old ones (e.g. final agreement on the “Berlin Plus” accord, providing EU access to NATO assets).

Institute of European Affairs
EFSP UPDATE–March 2003
Introduction

Over the past few months, the European Union’s foreign policy agenda has witnessed two contradictory trends: the emergence of new challenges (e.g. intra European and European-US tensions regarding war in Iraq) and the resolution of old ones (e.g. final agreement on the “Berlin Plus” accord, providing EU access to NATO assets).

Differing perspectives on the legitimacy of the war on Iraq have cast a shadow on the cohesion of the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. However, deliberations at the Convention on the Future of Europe on CFSP have continued apace, although the actual plenary debate on CFSP has been scheduled to commence in May 2003.
Of the numerous proposals advanced, two sets prove particularly interesting from an Irish perspective.
The first is reform of the Union’s external representation which involves a choice between a permanent Presidency or a strengthened office of an EU Foreign Minister. The second refers to EU defence policy, in particular to the distinction in the current debate between a ‘solidarity clause’ (aimed at averting non-State threats) and an opt-in Protocol for ‘collective defence’ (which provides for mutual assistance in the event of attack on one or more States).
Both sets of issues raise considerable questions regarding the distribution of power within the EU’s foreign and defence policy and Ireland’s stance towards it.
The focus of this newsletter is whether a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) remains elusive or whether it has become even more relevant in the light of current events. It suggests that much will depend on the lessons learned from the current crisis over Iraq. Another factor is the change of context in which the forthcoming Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) will decide on the final form of the draft Constitutional Treaty. This draft is now expected to be presented in September 2003 during the Italian Presidency of the EU.

The hour of Europe again?

Undoubtedly, the key issue facing the EU is deciding how it should respond to the crisis in Iraq. Despite the extraordinary Summit held by the Greek Presidency on 17 February 2003 and previous efforts made at the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) meeting (27-28 January 2003 and 19-20 March), a ‘common’ approach has eluded the Union.

At least two possible scenarios arise. A malign scenario would be one whereby war on Iraq might accentuate further US-defined divisions between ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Europe, seriously complicating and potentially delaying, if not derailing enlargement of the Union beyond May 2004. This might reduce, in turn, the political will necessary to reach agreement on a new Constitutional Treaty.

This might promote also the re-nationalisation of foreign policy and the consequent postponement of further development in CFSP and ESDP, thereby weakening the Union’s capacity to deal with crises on its borders. Such crises may increase if Turkey specifically and the Middle East generally are further destabilised by the current conflict, or if events in the Balkans degenerate while the international community’s attention is fixed elsewhere.

The more benign scenario would be one whereby the divisions caused by the war are seen as temporary and that in its aftermath, the Union undertakes an important role in the reconstruction of Iraq and in ensuring that international attention is properly focused on regional stabilisation and conflict resolution under the auspices of the UN.

It may emerge that the Iraqi crisis will underline the importance of a stronger CFSP and ESDP, thus accelerating the drive towards an effective, coherent and accountable policy at EU level.

This latter scenario may be realised if current efforts to overcome differences between EU Member States continue. At the European Council Summit on 20 March 2003, the Heads of State and/or Government of the Member States agreed a joint statement on what should happen once war is over. Avoiding a debate on whether war is justified, the leaders agreed that Iraq’s territorial integrity should be maintained, that the EU should assist with humanitarian aid and that the UN should play a central role “during and after the current crisis”.

The Quartet avoids Discord?

“The Quartet” comprising of :US Sec. of State, Colin Powell, Russian For. Min., Igor Ivanov, UNSG Kofi Anan and EU Rep. Danish PM Anders Rasmussen, (then holding EU Presidency).

Although EU leaders are divided over Iraq, a common perspective on the issue of the Middle East is emerging in the context of the diplomatic "Quartet.”, comprising of the U.N., the United States, the Russian Federation and the European Union . The Quartet, which was endorsed by the UN Security Council in September 2002, drew up a plan for the resolution of the Middle crisis, code-named the “roadmap”.

The roadmap builds upon major diplomatic initiatives which have been facilitated in the case of the EU by the High Representative, Javier Solana. The three year plan is divided into three phases designed to allay Israeli security concerns on the one hand, and to achieve the Palestinian goal of a Palestinian state on the other hand.

In deference to Israeli concerns, the US postponed publication of the roadmap in December 2002. However, the announcement in March 2003 by President Arafat that he had ratified the amendments to Palestinian law necessary to establish the position of prime minister, and that he had invited Abu Mazen to serve in that capacity has given fillip to the process and is likely to allay Israeli security concerns.

In a widely reported Rose Garden speech (14-03-03), US President Bush announced that he is committed to implementing the road map towards peace. Although he did not mention the Quartet specifically in his speech, he referred to the ‘close co-operation’ he had received from Russia, the EU and the UN in developing this plan.

Abu Mazen

In the absence of publicity, EU participation in the Quartet may go unnoticed and the perception that the EU is incapable of influencing events beyond its borders may be perpetuated. This would be unfortunate as the Quartet is an example of how significant consensus can be achieved within the EU on the best way to address a serious crisis.
Developing the CFSP and ESDP

The work of the Convention has gathered momentum with both Working Groups on External Action (WG VII) and Defence (WG VIII) publishing their Final Reports in December 2002.

Working Group VII (WG VII): External Action
One of the most important debates at the Convention on the Future of Europe has been whether or not defence should be separated from the foreign policy chapter in the Constitutional Treaty. Ireland’s preference is for defence to remain a component of the CFSP (where emphasis would remain on overall crisis management – both civilian and military) rather than emerge as a separate defence section (where emphasis would be on more defence-oriented issues).
Otherwise, there was significant support within WG VII for a definition of the underlying principles and objectives of EU foreign policy. The group also broadly agreed on a more effective and coherent European diplomatic representation and on increased resources for crisis management operations under the auspices of the CFSP.

External Representation
The most divisive issue in the current debate at the Convention remains the relationship between the offices of the High Representative (HR) for CFSP (currently Javier Solana) and the Commissioner for External Relations (currently Chris Patten). The options proposed for reform of these offices are:
• Merger of the functions of the HR into the Commission
• Double hatting – one person exercising a dual mandate from the Commission and the Council , or
• The creation of an EU Foreign Minister under the President of the European Council
This is an important decision in so far as it will determine the shape of foreign policy-making and will have important political, constitutional and institutional implications for the Union as a whole

(l-r) The High Rep., Mr. Javier Solana, Greek Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr. Giorgis Papandreou and EU Commissioner for External Relations, Mr. Chris Patten

The reforms proposed for the office of an EU Foreign Minister cannot be considered in isolation. Instead, they must be analysed in conjunction with the proposals for the Union Presidency since the ultimate aim of the Convention is to simplify Union representation and rationalise the distribution of power. In this regard, there are two main proposals which merit attention:
1. The creation of a new post of President of the European Council as well as a decision on the associated means of selection or election.
2. A review of procedures for the election of the President of the European Commission.
When examined together with the proposals for the External Representation, two main models of the distribution of power may be deduced.
The first model, associated with the British, effectively emphasises the role of the European Council and thus offers a more intergovernmental distribution of power. The second model, associated with the Benelux and Commission, offers a more federal distribution of power by strengthening the role of the Commission through increased powers and changes to the election procedure.
Superficially, a compromise model, proposed by the French and Germans in a Paper presented to the Convention on 16 January 2003, seems attractive, in that they propose a bifurcated Presidency with a new permanent President of the European Council and elected President of the Commission.

IEA Analysis of the Irish Response
However, examination of the proposals advanced by Minister for European Affairs, Dick Roche and the responses of the other Irish Representatives to the Convention, (e.g. those of Deputy John Bruton), suggests that Ireland seeks to modify Model 2.

Critically, all the Irish Representatives have expressed reservations about the proposal to elect a permanent President of the European Council on the grounds that it could threaten the EU’s delicate institutional balance and weaken existing checks and balances. Instead, they have advocated the strengthening of the role of Commission President and a different election procedure for this office.

While the Irish government has proposed election of the Commission President by an Electoral College with a 50:50 split between MEPs and national parliamentarians, John Bruton favours the direct popular election of a Commission President Thus far, the former has received more support than the latter.
In addition, practically all of the Irish representatives support the recommendation of WGVII to double-hat the roles of High Representative and the External Relations Commissioner. The Irish government supports the proposal for this person to have a right of initiative in relation to the CFSP without being a member of the Commission, but with increased resources and deputy representative posts to share the burden of office.
Contrary to the Franco-German proposal to end the rotating Presidency of the EU and split responsibility for EU foreign policy between a European Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary General of the Council; the Irish representatives have been considering the idea of some form of team Presidency. Despite continuity concerns, the Irish representatives maintain that the rotating Presidency gives a sense of ownership to each Member State, while also reinvigorating the work of the Council on a regular basis.

Working Group VIII (WG VIII): Defence
WG VIII reached consensus on several issues. Of these, the key recommendation concerned the expansion of the Petersberg Tasks to include:

• Conflict prevention,
• Joint disarmament operations,
• Post-conflict stabilisation,
• Support for a third country’s authorities (at their request) in combating terrorism,
• Support of local forces in calming hostilities.

One of the more divisive issues concerned the possible implications of a ‘solidarity clause’ and the necessity of a ‘mutual defence clause’. In the Group’s final report the proposed solidarity clause envisages using the Union’s instruments to avert a non-state terrorist threat – it does not refer to defence of territorial integrity. No agreement could be reached on including a mutual defence clause, which implies mutual assistance in the case of threat from other states.
However, an alternative would be to include a collective defence clause as an opt-in protocol. In principle, Ireland could agree to the inclusion of such a Protocol in the Treaty, although it is constitutionally precluded from participating without recourse to a referendum.
Resolving the ‘Berlin Plus’ dispute and increasing capabilities

One of the most significant developments of recent months has been the resolution of the ‘Berlin Plus’ issue (i.e. the dispute regarding EU access to NATO assets). Having disagreed for over two years on the proposed EU use of NATO assets for fulfilling the Petersberg Tasks, agreement was reached with both Turkey and Greece.

This final ‘Berlin Plus’ package allows the EU access to NATO resources for ERRF crisis management exercises. It came in the midst of ultimately unsuccessful UN efforts in December 2002 to reunite the island of Cyprus ahead of its proposed entry into the EU.

Meanwhile, an agreement on the security of information systems between the EU and NATO, whereby NATO will be authorised to forward confidential information to the EU, was signed at an informal meeting of EU defence ministers in Athens on 14 March 2003.

This meeting also focused on the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) which attempts to analyse how to make up the EU’s existing shortcomings in the field of military capabilities. It is expected that a new catalogue of capabilities for 2003 will be established in May 2003.

Policing the Balkans and ‘Allied Harmony’

Another development, linked with the Berlin Plus agreement, has been the establishment of the first ever European Union Police Mission (EUPM), which was officially inaugurated on 15 January 2003. The three-year EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the first EU civilian crisis management operation under the European Security and Defence Policy (EDSP).
Picture taken at the official launch of EUPM 15-01-03
Its mission is to help the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina to develop local police forces so that they can meet the highest European and international standards and to ensure that sustainable institutional structures are in place by the end of 2005. Staff will monitor, mentor and inspect local police managerial and operational capacities at a total cost of €38 million per year (funded through the Community budget and Member State contributions).

In addition, the ‘Berlin Plus’ accord has injected renewed impetus into plans for the EU to assume command of the NATO-led “Allied Harmony” mission in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia (FYROM). As it stands, the six-month mission of the 487-strong force is designed to support international monitors in the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement (a peace accord negotiated in Autumn 2001 which ended months of fighting between the Macedonian security forces and ethnic Albanians).

The Copenhagen European Council (December 2002) already confirmed the Union’s readiness to take over the military operation in FYROM. In early January a formal invitation was issued to the EU from Macedonian President, Boris Trajkovski, to “take the necessary measures” to progress with the take-over. Consequently, on 27 January 2003, the General Affairs Council (GAC) commenced formal talks with NATO in order to implement the agreement.

NEWSFLASHES
Yugoslavia - no more:

On 5 February 2003, the Parliament of Yugoslavia voted in favour of the draft Constitution to replace ‘Yugoslavia’ with a new entity entitled ‘Serbia and Montenegro’. This landmark decision followed the historic ratification of the new Constitution by the Montenegrin and Serbian parliaments.

Agreed upon in March 2002, the original accord was designed to end Montenegrin calls for independence and any further violent disintegration of the region. Considerable credit for its success must be given to the EU High Representative, Javier Solana, who mediated and facilitated negotiations intensely in the months prior to its agreement.

‘Serbia and Montenegro’ will comprise two semi-independent States, sharing common defence and foreign policies, but with separate economies, currencies and customs services. It will remain in place for three years, at which point either party is entitled to hold a referendum on independence. With the assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djinjic on 12 March, 2003, one can only speculate as to whether or not the decision will offset further disintegration in a barely stable region.

Ireland

The Attorney General (AG) has ruled out the possibility of the Irish Defence Forces (IDF) participating in the proposed EU take-over of NATO’s ‘Allied Harmony’ mission in FYROM. Under current Irish defence legislation, IDF participation in the mission is not permissible since the mission does not have a specific UN mandate.

While there was suggestion that the defence legislation might be subject to review, it seems the advice of the AG will stand and the ‘triple lock’, emphasised in the Nice referenda, will remain. Under the triple lock IDF deployment is subject to a UN mandate (lock 1) Government sanction (lock 2) and Dail approval (lock 3).

Nice to be implemented

The Treaty of Nice officially entered into force on 1 February 2003, marking a crucial step in the course of European integration and enlargement. Formal accession of the candidate States will be marked in Athens on 16 April 2003.

The IEA

The IEA EFSP Group has devoted a significant amount of time to the analysis of the key issues at stake in the Convention on the Future of Europe. Parallel to this, a series of lectures are being organised to brief IEA members on all EFSP related developments. Javier Solana will give a lecture at the Institute in early April 2003.

Useful websites:

http://europa.eu.int
http://www.eu2003.gr
http://www.iiea.com
http://www.military.ie

Editors: Ben Tonra, Jill Donoghue,
Researcher: Yvonne Campbell